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CONFUSION IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT: HAS THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
REVISED ITS HIGH EVIDENTIARY STANDARD IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CASES?
Jessica L. Setzer*
I. INTRODUCTION

On one occasion, her boss told her: "Your elbows are the same color as
your nipples."' On another occasion, "you have big thighs," while he attempted
to look up her skirt. 2 He repeatedly leaned over her desk to peek down the front
of her dress, and caressed her arm from her shoulder to her wrist when he stood
next to her. 3 And twice, he patted his lap showing where she should have a seat
during a meeting. 4 What if she was your mother? Your sister? Your wife?
Would you find that this factual narrative presents sufficient evidence of sexual
harassment?
The Fifth Circuit in Shepherd v. Comptrollerof PublicAccounts of the State
of Texas answered this question in the negative, holding that while such
comments and actions were "boorish and offensive," they did not establish a
"hostile work environment" worthy of legal protection. 5 The Fifth Circuit has
repeatedly held that the decision in Shepherd expresses the stringent threshold
required to establish a hostile work environment resulting from sexual
6
harassment.
Every person (man or woman) has the right to work in a discrimination-free
work environment. Women have historically and empirically been subjected to
sexual harassment more often than men. Between 2010 and 2013, males filed a
small percentage-ranging from 16.2% to 17.6 0/o--of sexual harassment
charges. 7 Even today, many women endure sexually offensive behavior at
work. 8 Courts across the country have recognized this problem and have set a
* J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Mississippi College School of Law. I would like to thank my husband,
John Setzer, for his encouragement, patience, and unwaivering support during this entire process. I would also
like to thank Professor Judith Johnson for her insight and guidance throughout the review of this Comment.
Her scholarly work, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment to Be
"Severe or Pervasive" Discriminates Among "Terms and Conditions" of Employment, was a brilliant
inspiration.
I. Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts of the State of Tex., 168 F.3d 871, 872 (5th Cir. 1999).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 874.
6. See infra note 11.
7. Sexual Harassment Charges FY 2010 - FY 2013, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION http://www.eceoc.gov/ccoc/statistics/enforcemcnt/sexual-harassment-new.cfm.

8. "One in four women have experienced workplace sexual harassment." Gary Langer, One in Four
U.S. Women Reports Workplace Harassment, ABC NEWS POLLS (Nov. 16, 2011, 12:01 AM),
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standard that ensures women do not have to suffer in the work place. 9
The standard set forth in Shepherd requires severe and pervasive conduct to
evidence sexual harassment.1 0 This misstates the Supreme Court standard that
requires either severe or pervasive conduct. 1I1 Compared to other circuits,
women working in states within the Fifth Circuit have been forced to endure
more humiliating circumstances for a longer period before being able to obtain
legal protection from sexual harassment.
Just six years after Shepherd,. the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the
severe-and-pervasive standard was not the same standard established by the
Supreme Court. 12 Even so, the lower courts in the Fifth Circuit have continued
13
to cite Shepherd and its progeny as good law.
Fourteen years after the decision in Shepherd, and eight years after the court
overruled the Shepherd standard, the Fifth Circuit once again denounced
Shepherd.14 Even after overruling the Shepherd standard twice, the Fifth Circuit
and the lower courts still use the facts in Shepherd as a measuring stick for the

(last
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/201 1/I /one-in-four-u-s-womcn-reports-workplacc-harassment/
visited Feb. 24, 2015). While 25% of women claim they have experienced sexual harassment in the work
place, 70% of those women say they never reported the abuse. Jillian Berman & Emily Swanson, Workplace
Sexual Harassment Poll Finds Large Share Of Workers Suffer, Don't Report, HUFFINGTON POST BUSINESS,
(Aug. 28, 2013, 8:08 AM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/27/workplacc-scxual-harassmentpoll n 3823671.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
9. See, e.g., Sara L. Johnson, When is Work Environment Intimidating, Hostile, or Offensive, so as to
Constitute Sexual Harassment in Violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 252 (2014)
(discussing a collection of cases across the country in which the courts have discussed or decided the
circumstances of workplace sexual harassment).
10. Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 874 (emphasis added) (quoting Weller v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 84 F.3d
191, 194 (5th Cir. 1996)).
1I. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (emphasis added).
12. Harvill v. Westward Commc'n., LLC, 433 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) ("We
correctly stated the standard originally in Waltman v. Int'l. Paper, 875 F.2d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 1989); therefore,
subsequent incorrect statements of the test are not binding.").
13. See, e.g., Allard v. Holder, 494 Fed. Appx. 428, 432 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (citing to
Shepherd as requiring severe and pervasive that it would destroy the work environment); Stewart v. Miss.
Transp. Commn., 586 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Shepherd as an example of facts that do not create a
hostile work environment); Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada, 591 F.3d 761, 771-72 (5th Cir. 2009) (comparing the
facts of Shepherd to the facts of the case at hand to determine whether the case at hand was actionable);
Donaldson v. CDB Inc., 335 Fed. Appx. 494, 504 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (citing the facts of Shepherd as
an example of insufficient to be actionable under Title VII); Mire v. Texas Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., 286 Fed.
Appx. 138, 142 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (citing the facts of Shephard to establish whether the current
facts were actionable); Molero v. Port Cargo Enter., LLC, No. 04-1530, 2005 WL 757355, at *4 (E.D. La. Mar.
30, 2005) (citing the facts of Shepherd in deciding whether the instant case created a hostile work
environment); Callan v. Hopkins Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 4:08-CV-26, 2009 WL 241719, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 30,
2009) (citing the facts of Shepherd in deciding whether the instant case created a hostile work environment);
McGehee v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., No. 08-3851, 2010 WL 1716810, at *5 (E.D. La. Apr. 26, 2010) (citing
the facts of Shepherd in deciding whether the instant case created a hostile work environment); Hollins v.
Premier Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 736, 743 (N.D. Miss. 2011) (quoting Shepherd, "Title VII
was only meant to bar conduct that is so severe and pervasive that it destroys a protected class member's
opportunity to succeed in the workplace"); EEOC v. IPS Indus., Inc., 899 F. Supp. 2d 507, 518 (N.D. Miss.
2012) (citing the facts of Shepherd in deciding whether the instant case created a hostile work environment).
14. Royal v. CCC&R Tres Arboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 2013) ("[b]oth Hockman and
Shepherd have been called into question by our court in Harvill v. Westward Conunc'ns, LLC, 433 F.3d 428
(5th Cir.2005).").
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evidentiary standard in sexual harassment cases. 15 Time and again, the Fifth
Circuit and the lower courts are finding offensive conduct like that in Shepherd
to be merely isolated incidents that do not interfere with employees' overall
work performance. The Fifth Circuit has slowly moved toward a standard that
protects women; however, because of the current state of confusion, the lower
courts need more guidance. Both the Fifth Circuit and the lower courts should
resist citing Shepherd as an example of facts insufficient to be actionable under
Title VII.
This Comment will examine the severe or pervasive standard as interpreted
by the Fifth Circuit and compare that standard to other jurisdictions. First,
Section II will examine the history of Title VII and sexual harassment, as well as
how hostile environment case law has evolved from Title VII's inception.
Section III will map the hostile work environment standard across the country,
explaining how different circuits apply the severe or pervasive standard. Section
IV will describe how the standard has slowly evolved in the Fifth Circuit from a
standard requiring harassing conduct be severe and pervasive to a more
reasonable standard that is consistent with the rest of the circuits. The Comment
will then explain that the Fifth Circuit is in a state of confusion because
Shepherd and its progeny misstated the Supreme Court's standard. Finally, the
paper will conclude that the only remedy available is for the Fifth Circuit to
definitively overrule Shepherd and stop citing it with approval-making it clear
that courts should not use Shepherd to determine the existence of a hostile work
environment.

15. See, e.g., Silva v. City of Hidalgo, Tex., 575 Fed. Appx. 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished)
("Title Vil was only meant to bar conduct that is so severe and pervasive that it destroys a protected class
member's opportunity to succeed in the workplace.") (quoting Shepherd). The court determined the
harassment did not meet the extreme standard set by the Fifth Circuit; Wiggins v. St. Luke's Episcopal Health
Sys., 517 F. App'x 249, 251 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Hoclonan as not severe or pervasive); Price v. Am. Eagle
Airlines, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176510, 26 (W.D. La. Dec. 22, 2014) (citing Hocknian as not severe or
pervasive); Minnis v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., No. 13-00005-BAJ,
2014 WL 5364049, at *11 (M.D. La. Oct. 21, 2014) ("Title VII is intended only to prohibit and prevent
conduct 'that is so severe and pervasive that it destroys a protected class member's opportunity to succeed in
the workplace."') (quoting Shepherd) (emphasis added); Griffith v. City of New Orleans, No. 11-245, 2014
WL 5305631, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 15, 2014) (citing to Shepherd, stating-that defendant's conduct did not reach
the "Circuit's steep threshold for an actionable claim"); Bell v. Lane, No. 12-00529-BAJ, 2014 WL 4925682,
at *7 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014) (stating that defendant's conduct was not "severe and pervasive," quoting
Shepherd); Offord v. Lane, No. 12-00524-BAJ, 2014 WL 4828922, at *5 (M.D. La. Sept. 29, 2014) (requiring
severe and pervasive conduct); Turner v. Aurora Australis Lodge, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127961, 16 (N.D.
Miss. Sept. 12, 2014) (citing Hocknian as stating a "severe and pervasive" standard); Porter v. Houma
Terrebonne Hous. Auth. Bd. of Comm'rs, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115222, 14 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 2014) (citing
Hoclanan as facts insufficient to create a hostile work environment); Ray v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95193, 18 (S.D. Miss. July 14, 2014) (stating that the standard as stated by Hockman is
severe and pervasive); Crutchfield v. Railserve, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63641, 14 (M.D. La. May 8, 2014)
(stating the facts of Shepherd and Hockman were not severe or pervasive enough to be actionable); Kulp v.
UTMB Healthcare Sys., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152083, 12 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2013) (citing Shepherd as an
example of a set of facts more frequent (and thus more pervasive) than the current set of facts and still not
actionable).
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II. HISTORY OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII
A. The Civil Rights Act & Title VII

Nothing represents today's developing society like the working-woman. A
rising number of women have entered the workforce, becoming significant
financial contributors in the contemporary family paradigm. But this societal
shift from the traditional 'stay-at-home mom' to 'breadwinning head-ofhousehold' has not occured without a struggle.
This struggle includes
combatting sexual harassment.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination "on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 16 With the enactment of Title VII,
freedom from sex discrimination in the workplace became a federal statutory
right, although courts did not recognize sexual harassment as an actionable
offense until the 1970s. 17 One of the issues was Title VII's broad language. The
statute simply prohibited discrimination based on sex. 18 The courts did not
acknowledge hostile environment discrimination involving sexual harassment in
the early days of Title VII, although the courts recognized the theory of hostile
environment for racial and national harassment.19
B. Early Evolution of the Hostile Work Environment
In 1971, in Rogers v. EEOC, the Fifth Circuit decided the first case that
recognized discrimination because of a hostile work environment. 20 The court
acknowledged that Title VII's statutory protection encompassed "employees'
psychological as well as economic fringes," which included a work environment
free from a "discriminatory atmosphere."' 2 1 Rogers was not a case about sexual
discrimination; rather, it centered on a racial discrimination that created a hostile
22
work environment.

16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2. See Colleen M. Davenport, Sexual Harassment Under Title VII: Equality in
the Workplace or Second-Class Status?: Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 10 HAMLINE L. REV. 193, 194
(1987) (explaining that the first sexual harassment cases under Title VII were dismissed for failure to state a
claim).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
19. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 816-17 (1991) (concluding that the term
'sex' was added to Title V11 inadvertently and because legislators "hoped that the inclusion of sex would
highlight the absurdity of the effort as a whole, and contribute to its defeat"); Kelly C. Timmons, Sexual
Harassment and Disparate Impact: Should Non-Targeted Workplace Sexual Conduct Be Actionable Under
Title VII?, 81 Neb. L. Rev. 1152, 1157 (observing that early courts refused to recognize sexual harassment as a
cause of action because the discrimination was based on the woman's failure to provide sexual favors, "not
because of their gender. . . . Courts refused to equate acts motivated by sexual desire with sexual
discrimination.").
20. See Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment to Be "Severe or Pervasive" Discriminates Among "Terms and Conditions" of Employment, 62
MD. L. REV. 85, 91 (2003) (stating that courts recognized sexual harassment to be "in the nature of supervisory
frolic and detour").
2 1. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 197 1) disapproved of by EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466
U.S. 54 (1984).
22. Id. at 236.
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It was not until 1976 that any court recognized sexual harassment as a form
of sex discrimination under Title VII.23 In Williams v. Saxbe, the defendant
argued that there was no sexual harassment because it was an "isolated personal
incident" and such issues "should not be the concern of the courts and was not
the concern of Congress in enacting Title VII."' 24 But the court found that the
supervisor made unwanted sexual advances toward the victim and that those
actions "created an artificial barrier to employment."' 25 Appropriately, the court
decided that sexual abuse was actionable under Title VII.
In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) finally
issued guidelines to explain that harassment on account of an individual's sex
violated Title VII.26 Even so, the courts were slow in recognizing sexual
harassment, although they had recognized racial harassment earlier.2 7 Because
Congress did not expressly define 'discrimination,' courts were reluctant28to find
harassment unless the plaintiff could show a tangible loss in job benefits.
Shortly thereafter, the District of Columbia Circuit expanded the holding of
Rogers and evaluated a hostile work environment, in the context of sexual
harassment in Bundy v. Jackson.29 In analyzing Rogers and other racially
discriminatory environment cases, the court found that the racial harassment
cases were relevant to the sexual harassment issue. 30 The court also looked to
the EEOC's newly issued guidelines, stating that the purpose of the broadly
worded guidelines was to prevent sexual harassment. 3 1 The court held that
sexual harassment (by way of a discriminatory work environment) was illegal
sex discrimination. 32 By extending the Rogers holding to sexual harassment
cases, the court gave women legal recourse for situations where they are forced
to endure a hostile work environment. 33 Before Bundy, harassed women had
34
little remedy unless they proved a tangible loss of employment benefits.
C. The Supreme Court Defines the Hostile Work Environment Standard
In 1986, the issue of whether a hostile work environment constituted a Title
VII violation went before the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
23. Williams v. Saxbc, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976) vacated sub norn. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d
1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
24. Id. at 660.
25. Id. at 657.
The guidelines detailed harassment as: unwanted sexual
26. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 a (1980).
advancements, soliciting sexual favors, and any other sexual conduct that either interfered with a person's work
performance or that constituted "an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."
27. Johnson, supra note 20 at 92.
28. Victoria T. Bartels, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: The Supreme Court's Recognition of the
Hostile Environment in Sexual HarassnentClains, 20 AKRON L. REV. 575, 576 (1987).
29. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
30. Id.
at 945.
31. Id. at 947.
32. Id.at 948.
33. Id.at 945.
34. See Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 49 (1990) (explaining that the tangible loss includes "undermining of the individual's wellbeing").
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Vinson.3 5 Meritor followed Rogers and the EEOC guidelines when it decided
that a hostile work environment violated Title VII's statutory protection. 36 The
Court determined that in order for sexual harassment to be actionable under Title
VII, "it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.' 37 The
Court opined that Congress's intent was not to limit the protection of Title VII to
tangible discrimination, but to "strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment." 3 8
In Meritor, the plaintiff, Mechelle Vinson, was a bank teller who alleged
sexual harassment at the hands of her supervisor. 39 Vinson admitted her
supervisor forced her into sexual relations spanning many years because she was
afraid of losing her job.4 0 The supervisor's offenses included fondling Vinson in
the presence of other employees, exposing himself to her, demanding sex, and
forcing himself on her to the point of rape on several occasions. 4 1 The Court
held that Vinson's allegations, "which include not only pervasive harassment but
also criminal conduct of the most serious nature-are plainly sufficient to state a
claim for 'hostile environment' sexual harassment. '4 2 Meritor legitimatized the
hostile work environment under Title VII and set the standard that the harassing
conduct must be sufficiently 'severe or pervasive' to alter the terms and
conditions of employment. 43
D. Clarifyingthe Hostile Work Environment Standard
In 1993, the Supreme Court revisited the evidentiary standard for a sexually
discriminatory work environment in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 44 The Court
clarified that the standard was both subjective (the victim must perceive the
environment to be abusive) and objective (a reasonable person would find the
environment abusive), and it had to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 4 5 In
Harris, both the trial court and the court of appeals held that the abuse Teresa
Harris endured would offend "the reasonable woman"; however, the offensive
conduct did not create a discriminatory environment because she suffered no
psychological harm. 46 But The Supreme Court held that an abusive work
environment can be present in the absence of "tangible effects."'4 7 The Court
35. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
36. id. at 65-66.
37. Id. at 67 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 64.
39. d at 59-60.
40. Id. at 60.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 67.
43. Id. The Court did not specify how to determine whether harassment is severe or pervasive. It
simply stated that the "gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
'unwelcome' and that voluntary participation of the plaintiff is not a defense." Id. at 68.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
Id. at 21.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 22.
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explained that Title VII encompasses an expansive requirement for equality in
the workplace. 48 Ultimately, the Court reaffirmed Meritor, but went on to
explain that the hostile environment standard was "a middle path" between a
statement or action that was "merely offensive" and abuse so severe that it
49
caused actual harm.
Harris stressed that it was important to look at the totality of the
circumstances to decide whether the environment was objectively hostile
because the objective standard is mathematically imprecise. 50 The Court
established factors that might be pertinent to that analysis: whether the abuse
caused psychological harm, the frequency of the abuse, the severity of the abuse,
if the abuse was threatening or humiliating, and whether the abuse interfered
with the victim's job performance. 5 1 The Court made it clear that this was52 not
an exhaustive list and none of the factors were independently determinative.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia admitted that the standard was
unclear, stating that the court was leaving the decision to "virtually unguided
juries."'5 3 He further explained that adding the reasonable person standard did
nothing to clarify the Meritor hostile work environment test. 54 The test was not
whether the victim's work was actually "impaired," but rather whether the
"working conditions [were] discriminatorily altered."'5 5 Justice Ginsburg, in her
concurring opinion, restated that the test was simply whether a reasonable person
in the victim's situation would find that the abuse made it more difficult to
56
perform her duties.
Five years later, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the
Supreme Court faced another hostile environment case-one based on same-sex
discrimination. 57 Even under a new set of facts, the Court could not further
clarify the hostile work environment standard. Oncale reiterated the standard
from Meritor: the abuse must be severe or pervasive to the point of altering the
victim's work environment. 5 8 The Court also ruled that this standard did not
depend on whether the victim and the abuser were of the same sex. 59 The Court
recognized that in racial hostile work environment cases, abusers will
discriminate against members of their own race, and likewise, abusers will
60
discriminate against the same sex.
Falling in line with Harris,the Oncale Court explained that the hostile work
environment standard is objective, and the abuse must be considered in light of
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Scrvs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
Id. at81.
Id. at 79.
Id.
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the surrounding circumstances. 6 1 These circumstances include the social context
surrounding the harassment. 62 The Oncale Court concluded that the impact of
the work environment "often depends on a constellation of surrounding
circumstances, expectations, and relationships. ' 63 The Court was careful to note
that the reasonable person standard was imperative in preventing "ordinary
socializing in the workplace" from being interpreted as a hostile work
environment. 64 The Court stated that it is difficult for the victim to portray the
big picture by a simple recitation of the facts. 6 5 Therefore, courts should use
"common sense" to distinguish between horseplay and actionable sexual
harassment. 66 Title VII was not intended to be a "general civility code."' 67
In 1998, the Supreme Court decided two sexual harassment cases:
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, which
set forth a standard for employer liability and expounded on conduct that reaches
the level of severe or pervasive. 68 In Ellerth and Faragher,the Court held that
an employer is liable for sexual harassment in the workplace. 6 9 Where there is
no tangible loss of employment, the employer may raise the defense that: (1) it
took reasonable care to prevent and correct the harassment, and (2) the employee
did not use those procedures to cure the problem. 70
In Ellerth, the harassment included unfulfilled threats to deny the plaintiff
job benefits. 7 1 The Court held that such harassment should fall under a hostile
work environment claim. 7 2 The Court acknowledged that plaintiffs generally
were persuaded to plead a quid-pro-quo claim on the basis that the employer
would then be strictly liable. 73 In its analysis, the Court held that any
harassment that did not result in a significant tangible employment action would
be actionable under a hostile work environment claim. 74 In addition, the Court
reaffirmed the Meritor severe or pervasive standard for harassment under hostile
75
environment.
In Faragher,the Court also reaffirmed Meritor, as well as its progeny. 7 6 It
restated that the harassment must meet both the subjective and objective
reasonable person standards. 7 7 The Court made it clear that the lower courts
61. Id. at 81.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 82.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 81.
68. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellcrth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775 (1998).
69. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-8.
70. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.

71. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747-48.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 754.
Id. at 753.
ld. at 754.
Id.
Faraghcr v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786-88 (1998).
Id. at 787 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993)).
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must look to the'totality of the circumstances in deciding whether the abuse
reaches the severe or pervasive requirement. 78 Finally, Faragherreiterated that
these standards were meant to prevent Title VII from degenerating to a "general
civility code"-there must be a change in the condition of the victim's
employment. 79 The Court noted, however, that when these standards are used
correctly, the innocuous behavior of "the sporadic use of abusive language,
gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing" would easily be distinguished from
harassing conduct. 80 The Court also insinuated the severe or pervasive standard
is not a very high threshold when it stated that courts should be able to easily
81
filter innocent conduct.
III. MAPPING THE HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT STANDARD ACROSS THE
CIRCUITS

While the Fifth Circuit had an extreme threshold for establishing a hostile
work environment (conduct must be both severe and pervasive) other circuits
took a more reasonable approach. Most circuits focused on the totality of the
circumstances in deciding whether harassment was severe or pervasive. So
those courts found harassment in cases where the incidents were not severe, but
frequent, as well as single-incident or low frequency cases that were more
severe.
A. Hostile Work Environment as the Result ofDisparagingComments

The Supreme Court has stated any verbal or physical conduct that meets the
requirements of Title VII may give rise to a hostile work environment. 82 The
sexually hostile environment may be created by "discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule and insult." 83 The Supreme Court also stated that humiliation is one of
the factors courts should use to determine whether there is a hostile
environment. 84 The majority of circuits have held the pervasive use of
disparaging and insulting remarks toward women can be actionable harassment
under Title VII.85 "A raft of case law. . . establishes that the use of sexually
78. Id.
79. Id. at 788 (citing Oncale v. Sundowncr Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Oncalc v. Sundowncr Offshore Scrvs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998).
83. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
84. Idat 23.
85. See Passananti v. Cook Cty., 689 F.3d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that the defendant's
constant use of the word "b****" was sufficient to create a hostile work environment), Harris v. Mayor of
Bait., 429 F. App'x 195, 202 (4th Cir. 2011), (reversing summary judgment for the defendant because nude
pictures and frequent name calling such as "b******," "c****," and "troublemakers" created a hostile work
environment); EEOC v. Fairbrook Mcd. Clinic, P.A., 609 F.3d 320, 329 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding where the
defendant used the term "s***" to refer to women, discussed female body parts in graphic terms, asked if the
plaintiff "had a better libido" after giving birth, and stated "she was probably a 'wild thing' in bed" was severe
enough to create a hostile environment); Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 811-12
(1 Ith Cir. 2010) (characterizing the use of terms "w****," "b****," and "c***" as discriminatory language);
Gallagher v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 567 F.3d 263, 267-268, 274 (6th Cir. 2009) (reversing summary
judgment because the fact that employees routinely described women as "b******, w*****, s****, d** **, and

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW

degrading, gender-specific epithets, such as 's***,' 'c***",' 'w****,' and
'b****,' with which [the defendant] barrage[s] [the plaintiff] at work, has been
consistently held to constitute harassment based upon sex."' 86 Similar to
derogatory comments, the posting of pornographic pictures may also serve as
evidence of a hostile environment. 87 Further, the Supreme Court stated,
"harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex," as long as the court finds that it
is "clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of
women in the workplace." 88
The First Circuit has found a hostile work environment where the offensive
conduct substantially involved sexual comments and inappropriate gestures. 89

Gina Marrero worked as a secretary under the Vice President of Sales, Ramon
Cardenas. 90 Cardenas made offensive sexual remarks by referring to Marrero as
the "hot" redhead and making comments about different parts of her body. 9 1
Cardenas would also leer at Marrero, bump into her when they passed in the
hallway, and rub against her at the copier machine. 92 His derogatory actions
went beyond sexual in context. He would give her extra work at closing time,
forcing Marrero to stay late without overtime pay. 93 He changed her hours,
forcing her to wait five hours for lunch even though she was hypoglycemic. 94
And he would deny her bathroom breaks. 9 5 The First Circuit ruled that

c****," and called the plaintiff a "b****" and a "heifer" with "udders" was sufficient to create a hostile
environment); Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, 79 F.3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding sexually explicit
statements, such as "w"",""b****," and "curbside c***," pervasive enough to create an actionable offense
under Title VII); Burns v. McGregor Elcc. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that use of
"b****," Is***," and "c***," was sufficiently severe or pervasive); Livingston v. Marion Bank & Trust Co.,
30 F. Supp. 3d 1285 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (finding a hostile work environment created by harassing comments,
including inappropriate compliments, questions about the plaintiff's sex life, and invasive questioning into the
plaintiff's experience of previously being raped).
86. Forrest v. Brinker Int'l Payroll Co., LP, 511 F.3d 225, 229 (1st Cir. 2007).
87. Harris v. Mayor of Bait., 429 F. App'x 195, 202 (4th Cir. 2011) (reversing summary judgment for
the defendant because nude pictures and frequent derogatory name calling created a hostile work environment);
EEOC v. Central Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 170-73 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that co-worker in the next
cubicle watched pornography with audio, to which plaintiff was forced to listen, combined with disparaging
comments, resulted in a hostile work environment); Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485-86 (3d Cir.
1990) (finding name calling, pornography, and displaying sexual objects on desks to be sufficient to create a
hostile work environment); Beach v. Yellow Freight Sys., 312 F.3d 391, 397 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that
graffiti that included sexually explicit drawings and phrases demonstrated severe and pervasive harassment);
Vanskyock v. St. Gobain Containers, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56148, 19 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 23, 2012)
(holding that the plaintiff exposed to multiple sexually explicit pictures or cartoons, many of which referred to
her specifically, created a hostile environment); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (stating that pornography "has a disproportionately demeaning impact" on women and thus
can serve as evidence of a hostile work environment).
88. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
89. Marrero v. Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 2002).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 19.
92. Id. at 14.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 14-15.
95. Id. at 15.

CONFUSIONIN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Cardenas's conduct was pervasive, occurring almost on a daily basis. 96 His
sexual comments, unwanted touching, and nonsexual abuse provided sufficient
evidence of a hostile work environment. 97 These facts are very similar to the
facts in Shepherd, yet the First Circuit found the facts were sufficient to cross the
threshold for severe or pervasive.
B. Single-Incident Sexual Harassment
When Meritor stated that harassment is evidenced when the conduct is
sufficiently severe or pervasive, the Supreme Court indicated that a single
incident could adequately support a hostile work environment claim. 9 8 Many
courts have found single instances and infrequent instances of abuse sufficient to
create a hostile work environment. 9 9
The single-instance harassment does not have to be so severe as to be
criminal. 100 It simply needs to be "of such a nature that a reasonable person in
plaintiff's position 'might well experience that type of behavior as humiliating,
and quite possibly threatening."'101 The Second Circuit found a single instance
of harassment between a union member and the union president in Scott v. City
of New York Department'ofCorrections.10 2 Plaintiff met with the defendant
alone in his office. 10 3 During the meeting, the defendant made several verbal
10 4
advances, eventually leading up to him forcing his tongue into her mouth. 105
After she refused his advances, the defendant told her to remove her clothes.
The court stated that this incident was "highly obtrusive and offensive" and that
"a reasonable jury could conclude this was an 'extraordinary severe' single
6
event." 10
The Tenth Circuit found a hostile work environment where the plaintiff
96. Id. at 19.
97. Id. at 20.
98. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
99. Moring v. Ark. Dep't of Corr., 243 F.3d 452, 456 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding single incident in motel
room that involved touching the plaintiff's thigh and attempting to kiss her was sufficient to create sexualharassment question for jury); Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that an assault
rising to the level of criminality was sufficient to create a hostile work environment); Lockard v. Pizza Hut,
Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1074 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that single instance of customer abuse where the customer
grabbed the plaintiffs breast created a hostile environment); Guthrie v. Baker, 583 F. Supp. 2d 668, 672 (W.D.
Pa. 2008) (holding that two instances of inappropriate touching was severe enough to establish a hostile work
environment); Scott v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Corr., 641 F. Supp. 2d 211, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that
where the defendant forced himself on the plaintiff, putting his tongue in her mouth and telling her to remove
her clothes, all after several verbal advances, constituted a hostile work environment); Prindle v. TNT Logistics
of N. Am., 331 F. Supp. 2d 739, 751 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (finding the single instance of touching plaintiffs
breasts "sufficiently invasive, humiliating and threatening to poison plaintiffs working environment"); Jones v.
U.S. Gypsum, No. C99-3047-MWB, 2000 WL 196616, at *1 (N.D. Jan. 21, 2000) (holding that a single
instance of striking the plaintiff in the groin was sufficiently severe enough to create a hostile environment).
100. Prindle v. TNT Logistics of N. Am., 331 F. Supp. 2d 739, 751 (W.D. Wis. 2004).
101. Id. (quoting Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc. 218 F.3d 798, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2000)).
102. Scott v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Corr., 641 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
103. Id. at225.
104. Id. at 226.
105. Id.
106. id. (quoting Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 79 (2nd Cir. 2008)).
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suffered only one instance of sexual harassment and held the employer liable for
the conduct of its customers.10 7 In Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., the plaintiff
prevailed on her sexual harassment action when two male customers were
abusive, and the manager knew about the abuse but did nothing to stop it. 108
The two obnoxious men had a history of making inappropriate sexual comments
when they dined at the restaurant. 109 The manager forced Lockard to wait on the
men although she previously informed him she was uncomfortable doing so.I 10
When she approached the table, one of the customers made an inappropriate
comment and pulled her hair.I t Lockard again informed the manager that she
did not want to wait on the men and notified him that they grabbed her hair. 112
He ignored her plea and forced her to continue waiting on them.1 13 When
Lockard returned to the table with a pitcher of beer, one of the men grabbed her
by the hair again, pulled her to him, grabbed her breast and put his mouth on her
breast. 114 She immediately quit and left the premises.115
Lockard held the conduct of the two men rose to the level of severity
required and created a hostile work environment. 116 The court reiterated the
premise in Harris: the hostile work environment is decided on "whether the
workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult."'] 17 Further, when the manager condoned the conduct of the two men by
forcing Lockard to serve them after her protest, he aided in creating the hostile
work environment.1 18
The Seventh Circuit also found a single incident sufficiently severe to
create a hostile work environment in Smith v. Sheahan.119 Valeria Smith worked
as a guard at the Cook County Jail with Ronald Gamble. 120 She and Gamble
were arguing when he called her a "b****," threatened her, and pinned her
against the wall. 12 1 While pressing her wrists against the wall, he twisted one
enough to draw blood and damaged the ligaments. 122 Smith filed criminal
charges against Gamble, and he was found guilty of battery. 123 Gamble had a
history of verbally and physically abusing other women officers at the jail. 124
The court ruled that the severity of the assault, combined with Gamble's
107.
108.
109.
110.
11 .
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1067.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1074.
Smith v. Shcahan, 189 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 530.
Id. at 531.
Id.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 533.
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propensity of abuse towards female coworkers, created a hostile work
25
environment. 1
The Seventh Circuit later reaffirmed the single-instance hostile work
environment claim on even less severe facts. 12 6 In Berry v. Chicago Transit
Authority, the plaintiff was seated at a picnic table during break. 127 After she
refused to get up, a coworker reached from behind, grabbed her breasts, and
jerked her from the table.12 8 He lifted her against his body and rubbed her
buttocks against his groin three times before he shoved her into a fence. 129 The
parts of the body"
court stated that when physical altercations involve "intimate
'13 0
they create "the most severe types of sexual harassment."
The single incidents in Lockwood, Sheahan, and Berry fall far below the
pervasive standard set in Shepherd. The conduct in Shepherd occurred over a
period of one year, and the court found such conduct failed to meet its pervasive
standard. 13 1 Because the harassment in Lockwood, Sheahan, and Berry was not
both pervasive and severe, it likely would not be actionable under Shepherd.
C. Hostile Work Environment Resultingfrom Infrequent Harassment
The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that a lack of frequency will not
prevent a hostile work environment. "A female employee need not subject
herself to an extended period of demeaning and degrading provocation before
being entitled to seek the remedies provided under Title VII."132 In Carrerov.
New York City Housing Authority, the plaintiffs harassment began when the
defendant, Peterson, inappropriately touched her knee and arm, kissed her on the
neck twice, attempted to kiss her twice, and made degrading comments in front
of coworkers that brought her to tears. 1 3 3 In reviewing Peterson's conduct, the
court stated that the duration of the harassment was not the issue. 13 4 Instead, it
was the offensiveness of the behavior that made it pervasive. 135 Peterson was
of power, his repeated sexual advances
Carrero's supervisor, and in that position
"w[ere] tantamount to coercion."' 36 The court ruled that this behavior was
pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. 13 7 Again, these facts do
not reach the level of severity and pervasiveness in Shepherd, yet the Second
Circuit found them to be sufficiently pervasive because of Peterson's
persistence.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Berry v. Chicago Transit Auth., 618 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 689.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 692.
Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 872 (5th Cir. 1999).
Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 573.
Id. at 578.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Seventh Circuit found a hostile work environment existed when
physical contact became intimate and intrusive in Hostetler v. Quality Dining,
Inc. 13 8 Ann Hostetler suffered three instances of physical sexual harassment at
the hands of her supervisor, Tim Payton. 139 The first incident occurred when
Payton grabbed Hostetler by the face and forced his tongue "down her
throat." 140 The next day he grabbed her face in an attempt to kiss her again. 14 1
When she bent away from him, he started to unsnap her bra and succeeded in
unsnapping four of the five hooks. 142 The third incident occurred in front of a
customer when he told her "he could perform oral sex on her so effectively that
'she would do cartwheels."', 14 3 The court stated that it would be impossible for
a
reasonable person to interpret such conduct-having someone's tongue shoved
in her mouth or having her bra almost removed-as not severe.144 It was the
"physical, intimate and forcible nature" of the acts that made them severe
enough to create a hostile environment in the absence of additional
harassment.

14 5

The Tenth Circuit found a hostile work environment when a manager made
a total of six disparaging remarks to the plaintiff in front of her coworkers in
Smith v. North West FinancialAcceptance, Inc.14 6 Debbie Smith worked as an
account services representative under the management of Curtis Mangus. 14 7 The
workplace was a small office of six employees sharing an open area. 14 8 Mangus
made all six statements in front of the other four employees. 149 The court
observed several statements as "severe enough to affect a reasonable person's
identity as a woman." 150 These statements included Mangus telling Smith to
"get a little this weekend so she would come back in a better mood"; Smith was
a "sad piece of a** who can't keep a man"; and Smith would be "the worst piece
of a** I ever had." 15 1 Specifically, the Tenth Circuit focused on the "intimate
setting" of plaintiffs workplace, where Smith's coworkers could hear the
abusive comments. 152 Such an intimate setting made the harassment more
humiliating and more severe. 15 3 These six statements still fall well below
Shepard standard.
The Sixth Circuit found a hostile environment as the result of pervasive
138.
139.
140.
141.

Hostetlcr v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 801-02.
Id.at 802.
Id.
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Id. at 808.
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154
harassment, even though the conduct only transpired over seventeen days.
The plaintiff, Sandra Barna, worked as a painter under her supervisor, Darrell
Thornton. 155 Thornton directed sexual comments and advances at Bama. 156 He
asked her to "suck his d***," bragged about his sexual abilities, made "carnal
characterizations" of Barna's body, called her a "white b****," grabbed her
from behind and squeezed her extremely hard so it "crushed" her breasts, and
made lewd gestures with his body parts toward her. 157 The court found that the
inappropriate touching and the proposal for oral sex "alone might be enough to
support a finding of a hostile environment."' 158 The Sixth Circuit also required a
severe-and-pervasive standard. 159 The court held that combined with the other
unwelcome verbal harassment occurring daily over a short period equaled both a
60
severe and pervasive hostile environment.1

IV. THE HISTORY OF HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

The hostile work environment standard established by Meritor arguably
legalized an unreasonable amount of sexual discrimination-barring only the
most egregious behavior. 16 1 Each circuit has early case law that illustrates the
Meritor standard. Still, most circuits ultimately followed a logical path and
came up with a more reasonable standard for hostile work environment. For too
long the Fifth Circuit cited Shepherd as good law, setting a standard much too
high for actionable sexual harassment. Over a fourteen year period, the Fifth
Circuit twice denounced the standard established by Shepherd. Yet today, the
Fifth Circuit and lower courts are confused-the courts still cite the facts of
Shepherd as a measuring stick of conduct that establishes a hostile work
environment. 162
A. Shepherd Set the Fifth CircuitStandardfor Hostile Work Environment
In analyzing the Supreme Court's hostile work environment standard, the
court in Shepherd first considered the pervasiveness of the abuse Teresa Moore
alleged. 163 The inappropriate remarks, the leering, and instances of offensive
touching all occurred over the course of a year. 16 4 The court recognized that
Moore did not detail every single incident in the complaint and acknowledged
154. Bama v. City of Cleveland, 172 F.3d 47 (6th Cir. 1998) ("The Court's decision is referenced in a
'Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions' appearing in the Federal Reporter.).
155.Id. at *1.
156.1d. at * 1-2.
157. Id.
158. Id. at *4.
159. See, e.g., Id. at *3. In 2009, this standard was denounced by the Sixth Circuit. Barrett v. Whirlpool
Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 514 (6th Cir. 2009). In 2012, the Sixth Circuit reiterated the standard to be disjunctive.
Berryman v. SuperValu Holdings, Inc., 669 F.3d 714, 717 (6th Cir. 2012).
160. Id. at *1.
161. Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 60-61 (1990).
162. See supra note 15.
163. Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts of State of Texas, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999).
164. Id.
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that it was likely more incidents could have occurred with some regularity over
that period.16 5 The Shepherd court disregarded the Supreme Court's disjunctive
severe-or-pervasive standard and stated that it had to weigh the severity of the
abuse in addition to the pervasiveness analysis. 16 6 The court found that although
the abuse occurred regularly, the incidents were "too tepid" and, therefore, not
actionable. 1 6 7 The severe-and-pervasive standard requires courts to find each
incident of harassment to meet a severe level. This standard is far more
demanding than the standard articulated by the Supreme Court. 168
Shepherd completely ignored the reasonable victim standard and did not
recognize that the facts presented an issue for the jury to decide. In doing so,
Shepherd set the threshold too high, stating harassment is only actionable when
it is "so severe and pervasive" that it "destroys" the employee's success at
work. 169 But in Harris, Justice Ginsburg explained the harassment only has to
show the abuse interfered with the plaintiff s performance. 170 The plaintiff does
not have to go so far as to prove the harassment destroyed her success in the
workplace. 17'
Because of the decision and analysis in Shepherd, the Fifth Circuit set an
extreme standard. It did so not only by requiring the harassment to be both
severe and pervasive, but also by requiring the harassment to have a severe
impact on the victim's job. In Harfield v. Pizza Inn, Inc., the plaintiff suffered
unwanted sexual advances from a coworker over a six-month period.1 72 During
that time, the defendant told her he liked the way she walked; several times he
cornered her and tried to kiss her; several times he touched her behind; he tried
to kiss her on the mouth and missed, kissing her cheek; and daily he would drive
by her house and honk. 17 3 The court compared the facts to Shepherd and ruled
that the harassment was not sufficiently severe and pervasive. 174 Women should
not have to endure unwanted sexual advances, drawn out over a six-month
period, where the harasser even carries the harassment to a point of stalking. A
reasonable person in the same situation would feel violated at having to avoid
165. Id. at 874.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Vivicn Toomey Montz, Shifting Parameters: An Examination of Recent Changes in the
Baseline ofActionable Conductfor Hostile Working Environment Sexual Harassment, 3 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
809, 842 (2002) (explaining that by requiring the incidents to each be severe "robs the incidents of their
cumulative effect and nullifies both the pattern and harassing nature of the conduct").
169. Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 874 (emphasis added).
170. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
The standard as stated in the opinion: "Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a
nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect
employees' psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage
employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. Moreover, even without
regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it
created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin
offends Title Vll's broad rule of workplace equality." Id. at 22 (majority opinion).
171. Id. at 25.
172. Hartfield v. Pizza Inn, Inc., No. 02-0097,2002 WL 31056595, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 2002).
173. Id.
174. Id. at *4-5.
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such pervasive behavior in the workplace. But those set of facts did not meet the
high standard set by the Fifth Circuit.
In another case, a lower court in the Fifth Circuit also denied a sexual
harassment claim in a situation where there were unwanted sexual advances,
inappropriate comments, and instances of offensive touching that occurred over
only fourteen days. 17 5 In Baker v Starwood Hotel and Resort Worldwide, Inc.,
on two separate occassions, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant grabbed her
and attempted to kiss her. 176 The second time he grabbed her breast, tried to kiss
her and attempted to force her hand to his crotch. 177 Again, the court compared
the facts to Shepherd.178 In doing so, the court stated, "Courts have set a high
bar for what constitutes sufficiently severe and pervasive harassment for the
purposes of a claim of a hostile work environment." 179 The court ruled that the
behavior was vulgar, ill mannered, and wrong, yet it did not meet the hostile
environment standard. 18 0 It is difficult to understand how two separate instances
within two weeks, both with aggressive physical touching, did not amount to
harassment. In raising the standard to such an extreme, the Fifth Circuit forced
women to endure "vulgar" and "ill-mannered" behavior until it crossed some
imaginary threshold.
In Thornhill v. Finley, Inc., multiple propositions for sexual favors in
exchange for money did not meet the Fifth Circuit's high standard. 18 1 The
plaintiff, Deborah Guillory Thornhill, worked at a nursing home under the
supervision of Finley Matthews, Jr. and Renee Matthews. 182 Over seven days,
Mr. Matthews propositioned Thornhill several times. 183 Mr. Matthews first
asked Thornhill if "she was the fooling around type."'184 He then offered her
$300 in exchange for her to perform sexual favors for him. 185 Three days later,
Mr. Matthews approached Thornhill again about his proposition, inquiring if she
planned to take the money. 186 Thornhill refused to perform any sexual favors,
and Mr. Matthews then offered to teach her how, along with more verbal sexual
advances. 18 7 After a few days, Mr. Matthews informed Thornhill she would
have to close the canteen Thornhill had been working in the activities center, but
assured her it was not because "she wouldn't give him none." 188 Thornhill went

175. Baker v. Starwood Hotel and Resort Worldwide, Inc., No. 98-2076, 1999 WL 397405, at *2 (E.D.
La. June 15, 1999).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at *3.
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. Id. at *4.
181. Thornhill v. Finley, Inc., No. 07-1033, 2008 WL 4344887, at * I (W.D. La. Sept. 23, 2008).
182. Id. at *1.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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to Mrs. Matthews to complain of her husband's sexual harassment. 18 9 Mrs.
Matthews simply told Thornhill to leave for the rest of the day. 190 Later that
afternoon, Mrs. Matthews called Thomhill and fired her. 19 1
In Thornhill, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the conduct was "both unprofessional and a
stunning display of bad judgment," but, in comparison to the facts of Shepherd,
the harassment was not sufficient to create a hostile environment. 192 Within a
week, Thornhill's supervisor offered her money for sexual favors three times.
As soon as she complained, she was fired. The question of severity should have
been an issue determined by the jury. A reasonable person could find that Mr.
Matthew's proposal to his subordinate-for prostitution-was an abuse of power
as well as severe harassment.
B. The Fifth CircuitPerpetuatedthe "Severe and Pervasive" Standard
Five years after Shepherd, in Hockman v. Westward Communications, LLC,
the Fifth Circuit reemphasized the severe-and-pervasive standard. 193 Ladona
Hockman worked as an editor for a paper owned by Westward
Communications. 194 She filed a sexual harassment claim against her coworker
Oscar Rogers. 195 Rogers repeatedly grabbed Hockman and brushed against her
breasts and buttocks. 196 He also slapped her buttocks; he grabbed her cheeks
and tried to kiss her; multiple times, he encouraged her to go into work early so
"they could be alone together"; and once he stood in the doorway of the
women's restroom, leering while she washed her hands. 197 Each of these
instances occurred over a sixteen-month period.19 8 When Hockman learned that
another coworker had also experienced the same harassment, she felt
comfortable reporting the abuse. 19 9
The Hockman court analyzed the facts by heavily relying on Shepherd.2 0 0
Consequently, the court found that Hockman's abuse was not as egregious as the
harassment alleged in Shepherd.20 1 Instead of looking at the circumstances in
their entirety (completely avoiding the pervasive standard) the court looked at
each separate incident and determined that each one was not severe. 20 2
Although the events added up to over a year of pervasive incidentsinappropriate comments, unwelcomed touching, grabbing her face, and leering
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from the bathroom door-the court decided that each instance was "isolated and
not serious." 203 Thus, the harassment was not severe and pervasive enough to
create a hostile work environment within the Fifth Circuit, based on the facts of
Shepherd.
C. Taking a Step in the Right Direction
After Ladona Hockman's complaint against Oscar Rogers, Molly Harvill
filed a second sexual harassment action against Rogers in Harvill v. Westward
Communications, LLC.2 04 The harassment Harvill faced was similar to the
harassment her coworker suffered in Hockman. Rogers grabbed her face and
kissed her, fondled her breasts, popped rubber bands at her breasts, patted her
buttocks, and brushed up against her backside. 2 05 The harassment occurred over
seven months, and the Fifth Circuit ruled the conduct was both severe and
pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. 206 One year after
Hockman, the same defendant and very similar circumstances equaled a very
different outcome.
The district court in Harvill found that the harassment did not meet the
standard in Shepherd: severe and pervasive. 2 07 The Court of Appeals
recognized, however, the inaccuracy of the conjunctive requirement and
correctly quoted the Supreme Court's standard as "severe or pervasive. '20 8 And
by looking at the facts in their entirety, the Harvill court confessed that the Fifth
Circuit had a history of misapplying the standard stated in Meritor and,
consequently, Shepherd and Hockman were not binding. 209 It appeared that the
Fifth Circuit had finally corrected the standard set forth in Shepherd.
V. THE

FIFTH CIRCUIT'S CONFUSION

The source of the problem with analyzing the standard for a hostile
environment ironically originated in the Fifth Circuit with the Supreme Court's
unfortunate adoption of the language taken from Rogers. When the Meritor
court analyzed the hostile environment, the Supreme Court cited Rogers as
requiring the severe-or-pervasive standard. 2 10 But this standard was taken out of
context. 2 11 Judge Goldberg's decision in Rogers commented on the need for
212
protection in a hostile environment, but it did not set such a high standard.
The Rogers decision involved an employee of an optometrist who alleged a
racially discriminatory work environment because the employer segregated his

203. Id.
204. Harvill v. Westward Commc'ns., LLC, 433 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 2005).
205. Id. at 435.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 432.
208. Id. at 434.
209. Id. at 435.
210. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
211. See Johnson, supra note 20 at 92.
212. Id.

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW

patients, which affected her job performance. 2 13 Today, those facts would never
meet the high standard set by the Supreme Court, especially in the Fifth Circuit
following Shepard.2 14 The verbiage the Court used to set the standard of severeor-pervasive was, in actuality, dicta the Rogers court used as an example of "a
hypothetical egregious hostile environment that did not purport to apply to the
facts before the court."' 2 15 In fact, the Court in Harris acknowledged that the
dicta in Rogers was merely an example of what harassment might entail and was
not meant to be the end-all standard. 2 16
Writing the opinion for the Fifth Circuit in Rogers, Judge Goldberg
clarified that while Congress intended to give individuals a discrimination-free
work environment; he did not consider it to include a "mere utterance ... which
engenders offensive feelings."'2 17 But Judge Goldberg went on to explain that he
could not envision a discriminatory environment that "could under no set of
circumstances ever constitute an unlawful employment practice." '2 18 Finally, to
complete his analogy, he stated, "[o]ne can readily envision working
environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely
the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers. ' 2 19 This
dictum established the severe or pervasive standard found in Meritor.
Now more than thirty years after Rogers, the Fifth Circuit must clear up
another source of confusion that has led to an improperly heightened standard for
a hostile work environment. Even though Harvill disclosed the Fifth Circuit's
misinterpretation of the severe-or-pervasive standard, stating that the district
courts within the Fifth Circuit were incorrectly applying the standard as in
Shepherd and Hockman, 220 courts still continued to cite those cases as symbolic
of what facts are insufficient for a Title VII claim. 22 1 Those cases expose the
Fifth Circuit's confusion. The standard was clearly a misstatement of what the
Supreme Court declared. And as the Harvill court explained, the Fifth Circuit

213. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1971), disapproved ofby EEOC v. Shell Oil Co.,
466 U.S. 54 (1984).
214. Johnson, supra note 20 at 92.
215. Id.
216. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
217. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Harvill v. Westward Commc'ns., LLC, 433 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir. 2005).
221. McGarry v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr., 355 F. App'x. 853, 858 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Shepherd as an
example where offensive and boorish conduct spanning over a year did not qualify as severe or pervasive);
Mire v. Tex. Plumbing Supply Co., 286 F. App'x. 138, 141-42 (5th Cir. 2008) (using the facts of Shepherd as
an example of an action that did not result in a hostile work environment); Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep't of Crim.
Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating the current set of facts did not reach the level of severity "we
have required" in Hockman and Shepherd); Vallecillo v. United States HUD, 155 F. App'x 764, 769 n.2 (5th
Cir. 2005) (citing the facts of Shepherd as a measuring stick for the current facts); Kirkland v. Hinds County
Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178136, 6 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 17, 2012) (citing to Hockman and
Shepherd as examples of facts insufficient for a hostile work environment claim); Sapp v. Potter, No. 1:07-cv00650, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127740, at *70 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2012) (citing to Shepherd as requiring the
harassment to "destroy the employee's opportunity to succeed"); Smith v. DeTar Hosp. LLC, No. V-10-83,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95903, at *48 (S.D. Tex. July II, 2012) (citing to Shepherd's facts); Hollins v. Premier
Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 736, 743 (N.D. Miss. 2011).
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imposed too high a threshold for an actionable offense by applying the wrong
standard. 2 22 But the Fifth Circuit did not explicitly overrule those cases because
it did not expressly state that Shepherd and Hockman reached the wrong
conclusion. As Royal explained, the Fifth Circuit has only "called into question"
Shepherd and Hockman.22 3 Because the court did not definitively overrule the
severe-and-pervasive standard, some lower courts ignored Harvill and continued
2 24
to use Shepherd and Hockman as a measuring stick for actionable harassment.
Once again, in 2013, the Court of Appeals readdressed the issue
surrounding Shepherd and Hockman.22 5 In Royal v. CCC & R Tres Arboles,
LLC, the district court cited both Shepherd and Hockman as indicative of facts
insufficient to create a hostile work environment and used those cases to
denounce the presence of harassment. 226 The Court of Appeals recognized that
both Shepherd and Hockman were "called into question by our court" in Harvill
2 27
because they applied the wrong legal standard.
The Fifth Circuit in Royal recognized that by applying the wrong legal
228
standard, Shepherd and Hockman may have reached the wrong conclusions.
The court did not say affirmatively that those cases reached the wrong decisions,
but Royal did call them into question. 22 9 Royal reiterated that the standard is
disjunctive, and the harassment does not have to be both severe and frequent to
230
establish a hostile work environment.
The lower courts within the Fifth Circuit today are simply in a state of
confusion over the hostile work environment standard. There are cases that
correctly acknowledge the holding in Royal, state in their opinions that Shepherd
and Hockman applied the wrong standard, and are able to come to reasonable
decisions. 23 1 Other lower courts, however, still have not taken full account of
Harvill or Royal.2 32 They continue to cite the facts of Shepherd and Hockman as
demonstrating insufficient facts to create a hostile work environment. 233 These
courts within the Fifth Circuit ignore the fact that Shepherd and Hockman denied
222. Harvill,433 F.3d at 436.
223. Royal v. CCC&R Tres Arboles, LLC, 736 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 2013).
224. See, e.g., supra note 14.
225. Royal, 736 F.3d at 402.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 402-03 (stating "both required the conduct to be 'severe and pervasive,' even as the Supreme
Court has made clear that the standard is 'severe or pervasive').
228. Id. at 403. It is evident that Hockman reached the wrong standard because Harvill reached a
different conclusion on essentially the same facts.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Gibbs v. Corinthian, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-00085-SA-DAS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18737, at *9 n.
3 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 17, 2015) ("The Fifth Circuit has since criticized the panels in Shepherd and Hockman for
failing to recognize that non-severe harassment can still be actionable if it is considered pervasive."); Grams v.
NAC Scrvs., LLC, No. 5:13-CV-320-DAE, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127117, at note*18-19, n.4 (W.D. Tex.
Sept. 11, 2014); Bookman v. AIDS Arms, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-814-B, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141583, at *9
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2014) (noting that Shepherd simply stated facts that were not severe enough); Matheme v.
Ruba Mgmt., No. 12-2461, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87777, at *15 (E.D. La. June 27, 2014) (acknowledging that
Hockman did have facts severe enough to evidence a hostile work environment).
232.See, e.g., supranote 15.
233.1d.
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culpability because the facts were not severe and pervasive enough to be
234
actionable.
Royal illustrates how absurd it is for the lower courts to follow those two
cases. Had Shepherd and Hockman used the correct standard, the outcomes
would have been different. And had the outcomes been different, those two
cases would not indicate facts insufficient to create a harassment claim. Rather,
those cases would be examples of sufficiently severe or pervasive hostile work
environments. In fact, Harvill was a similar set of facts (including the same
defendant) as Hockman, decided under the correct standard, and the Fifth Circuit
reached a different conclusion than it did in Hockman.2 35 The Harvill court even
acknowledged that Shepherd and Hockman could have come out differently, and
although the court did not expressly overrule the cases, it did call them into
36
question. 2
Because Shepherd and Hockman stated the wrong standard and courts are
still citing them as good authority, the Fifth Circuit must clear up the confusion
and definitively overrule them. Recently, the Fifth Circuit in Silva v. City of
Hidalgo, Texas, quoted Shephard, stating, "Title VII was only meant to bar
conduct that is so severe and pervasive that it destroys a protected
classmember's opportunity to succeed in the workplace. ' 23 7 Silva determined
the harassment did not meet the extreme standard set by the Fifth Circuit. 2 38
Confusion within the Fifth Circuit is still prevalent.
A. Recent Cases that Have Interpretedthe Standard Correctly
In Royal, the plaintiff was a leasing manager at an apartment complex who
suffered harassment from two maintenance workers. 2 39 The harassment
occurred over four days and occurred about twelve times. 240 The two men
would enter the plaintiffs small office, hover over her, and sniff.24 1 They also
sniffed at her when she exited the bathroom. 242 One of the men sat on a filing
cabinet, within arm's length of the plaintiff, with his legs spread open exhibiting
an obvious erection. 24 3 One of the men later told her, "I need a release." 244 The
court held that the facts justified a question for the jury. 24 5 The short period of
234. The conduct in Shepherd occurred over a year, but was not considered pervasive. Shepherd v.
Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 872 (5th Cir. 1999). Similarly, the conduct in Hockman occurred
over a year-and-a-half period and also was not pervasive. Hockman v. Westward Commc'ns., LLC, 407 F.3d
317, 328, 122 F. App'x 734, 745 (5th Cir. 2004).
235. Harvill v. Westward Commc'ns., LLC, 433 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2005).
236. Id. at 436.
237. Silva v. City of Hidalgo, Tex., 575 F. App'x. 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (emphasis
added).
238. Id.
239. Royal v. CCC&R Tres Arboles, LLC, 736 F.3d 396, 398 (5th Cir. 2013).
240. Id. at 399.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 402.
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four days was reasonably pervasive and the lack of physical contact was not
enough to overrule the finding of a hostile environment. 246 Had the court used
Shepherd as a measure of insufficient harassment, the facts of Royal would not
have been sufficiently severe and pervasive.
In 2014, the District Court for the Western District of Texas found that
frequent sexual comments created a hostile work environment in Sanders v.
Christus Santa Rosa PASC.24 7 The plaintiff, Stephanie Sanders, suffered verbal
harassment from Dr. Michael Decherd occurring early 2011 through the summer
of 2012.248 Dr. Dechard's harassment included showing Sanders a video of a
horse sodomizing a woman, using her phone without permission to "friend"
himself on Facebook, taking a photo of her without her knowledge and sending
it to another coworker, and showing her a picture of a man performing oral sex
on a woman. 24 9 Dr. Decherd repeatedly asked Sanders for her phone number,
cornered her in a utility room and told her she was sexy, told her that "she would
be a lot of fun with a few drinks in her," repeatedly asked her out for drinks, and
repeatedly gave unsolicited hugs. 2 50 The defendants cited to Hockman to argue
that these facts failed to reach the level of severity and pervasiveness to create a
hostile environment. 25 1 The court relied on Royal, noting that the Fifth Circuit
had called Hockman into doubt, and ruled that the facts aligned with the severity
2 52
and pervasiveness of Royal.
Another case from the Western District of Texas, Clopton v. Animal Health
International,Inc., concerned facts similar to Shepherd.253 Over the course of
three years, the plaintiff suffered verbal harassment by a coworker. 2 54 The
coworker asked her to sit on his lap, asked her to go out to his car with him,
suggested they go to the parking lot to have sex, commented on her clothes being
sexy, looked down her shirt, told her, "I can make you feel better than you ever
felt before," and repeatedly leered at her. 255 The court ruled that the harassment
occurred frequently enough to be pervasive, and was humiliating and
offensive. 2 56 While these facts seem less pervasive than those in Shepherd (a
few remarks stretched over three years), they are on par with the same level of
severity. Clopton indicates that some district courts in the Fifth Circuit are
making steps to a more reasonable standard of hostile work environment.
Nevertheless, not all courts are exhibiting Clopton's progress.
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B. Recent Case that Follows the Old Standard
In McKneely v. Zachary Police Department, the District Court for the
Middle District of Louisiana found vulgar, harassing comments to be less
egregious than those made in Shepherd and Hockman and granted summary
judgment for the defendant. 2 57 The plaintiff, Tracy McKneely, was an officer
for the Zachary Police Department who alleged harassment from her supervisor
Darryl Lawrence. 2 58 McKneely suffered frequent verbal harassment including:
"she had cobwebs on her p**** and needed them to be knocked off"; "when are
you going to give me some of that p****? I want to see how good it is"; if she
and his wife were not friends, he "would get that p****" and he would "see how
good it is."'2 59 He repeatedly asked her for sex, called her on the phone inviting

her to his house for sex, offered to fix a ticket if she would wear a skirt without
panties so he could "play with her p****," asked her for her p**** as he
followed her to her car, and showed her pornography. 260 The constant verbal
harassment occurred over an eighth-month period. 26 1 The court stated that the
facts were far less severe than those of Shepherd and Hockman.26 2 The court
found the conduct to be "inappropriate and understandably offensive" but did not
cross the threshold for severe or pervasive. 2 6 3
This case exemplifies the effect that the confusion in the Fifth Circuit can
have on the outcome of a case. McNeely completely misses the mark on
pervasiveness and severity by comparing the facts to Shepherd and Hockman,
even though these cases have been "called into question" by the Fifth Circuit. 264

Had the court followed Royal instead of Shepherd, the court likely would have
found the abuse sufficiently severe or pervasive.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Fifth Circuit established its severe-and-pervasive standard based on the
facts of Shepherd. As a result, the Fifth Circuit set an extremely high threshold
for sexual harassment actions to succeed because women were forced to prove
both severe and frequent abuse. Women in the Fifth Circuit were forced to
endure offensive conduct that would have been actionable in most other circuits.
Even after Shepherd was called into question many lower courts in the Fifth
Circuit repeatedly refused to recognized harassment that was frequent but not
severe (or even severe but not frequent).
Recently, the Fifth Circuit remedied this stringent standard, once again
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pointing out the Fifth Circuit's error in Shepherd. Yet the lower courts continue
to cite Shepherd and Hockman as examples of insufficient facts to establish a
hostile work environment. This exemplifies the extreme confusion within the
Fifth Circuit, where the lower courts are still citing to cases that have been
clearly denounced. To this day, courts compare the facts of sexual harassment
cases to those facts in Shepherd and Hockman. This occurs even though the
Fifth Circuit has acknowledged that the standard is a misstatement of the
standard set forth by the Supreme Court and has even said that, under the correct
standard, the results may have been different.
The Fifth Circuit has taken important steps to protect individuals from
enduring offensive behavior in the workplace, although it has taken more than a
decade to do so. Nevertheless, the lower courts within the Circuit are still
confused. Because some lower courts are still citing Shepherd as the standard
(even while a growing number are pointing out that it has been denounced) the
Fifth Circuit must stop citing to Shepherd with approval and clearly overrule
Shepherd and its progeny.

